In this paper I argue that a significant proportion of research on children's emotional geographies has been deployed to reinforce the importance of children's 'voices', their (independent) 'agency', and the various ways in which voice/agency maybe deemed 'political'. Without wishing to dismiss or dispense with such approaches, I explore potential ways to go 'beyond' concerns with voice/agency/politics. Initially, I review studies of children's participation (and participatory methods), activism and everyday lives that mobilise emotion and affect in productive ways. I contrast such studies with important questions raised by a reinvigoration of interest in the need for children to be able to represent themselves. I then explore the possibilities raised by so-called 'hybrid' conceptions of childhood -which go beyond biosocial dualisms -to enable further strides beyond voice/agency. Drawing on examples from alternative education and contemporary attachment theories, I explore some potential implications for children's emotional geographies and relational geographies of age of what I term 'more-than-social' emotional relations. Yet I do not offer an unequivocal endorsement of these hybrid emotions. Thus, I end the paper by issuing some words of caution -both in terms of the critical questions raised by more-thansocial emotional relations, specifically, and in terms of engendering broader debate about how and why scholars do (children's) emotional geographies.
Introduction
Reflecting a broader 'turn' to emotions and affect, children's geographers have sought to understand how emotions work in children's everyday lives. Children's and emotional geographies may be entangled in multiple ways: from children's own expressions of anxiety (Nayak 2003) or hope (Pain et al., 2010) , to the powerful feelings that undergird contemporary constructions of childhood (Valentine 1996) or adult memories thereof (Philo 2003) . Undoubtedly, children's emotional geographies have represented a rich vein of research. However, whilst there may be broad agreement that researching children's emotional geographies is a positive, worthwhile endeavour, there remain important, critical disjunctures in terms of how emotions and affects might be understood tomatter, both within and beyond the academy(e.g. Vanderbeck 2008) . Most notably, some recent critical debates have centred around the possible ways in which children's experiences maybe framed as 'political' (Skelton and Valentine 2003; Kallio and Häkli 2010) .
Whilst this paper does seek to intervene in these debates, it does so in a particular way. It seeks to set out some additional (perhaps alternative, perhaps complementary) frames through which children's emotional geographies might proceed. It is not intended as an agenda for how children's geographers could 'do emotion' differently. Rather more modestly, it aims to initiate consideration of a series of additional approaches and critiques that might offer different starting points for deliberations about how children's emotional geographies matter.
As I point out in the paper's conclusion, these approaches and critiques may have important ramifications for all scholars -not just 'children's geographers' -in terms of thinking how 3 and, especially, why they study (children's) emotions. To do so, I begin in section I by revisiting two (virtually) foundational principles in contemporary research on children's geographies and, indeed, broader social studies of childhood: notions of 'voice' and (independent) 'agency'. Several contemporary critics have attacked both principles. I draw upon their critiques to observe a general tendency in work on children's emotional geographies that has engaged somehow with questions of politics. That is, a tendency to deploy children's emotions somewhat instrumentally in support of voice and/or agency. In the second half of section I, and in order to frame what follows, I explore two of several possible responses to these critiques: first, I note some important exceptions to this instrumentalist tendency, focussing on studies of emotion, affect and children's politics that have moved 'beyond' voice and/or agency; second, I note calls to consolidate notions of voice and/or agency in the face of emotional and, especially, nonrepresentational children's geographies (Mitchell and Elwood 2012) .
I want to clarify that I am not assuming that going 'beyond' means dispensing with questions of voice/agency, nor that children's emotional geographies should (now) seek to move 'beyond' those notions, nor that the two possible responses cited above are incommensurate.
Rather, the remaining sections of the paper offer some additional ways of thinking and doing children's emotional geographies that may, in some contexts, be viewed as alternative, in others complementary, and, in others, as unnecessary or undesirable. Indeed, section III offers one set of broader reflections on why thinking and doing children's emotional geographies at all may require further critical reflection. I focus in section II upon one set of ways to 'go beyond' voice/agency, inspired by a recent impulse outside geographical scholarship to exceed biosocial dualisms that have characterised much childhood research (Ryan 2011) . I frame my discussion in what Ryan (2011, 2) terms a "new wave" of childhood studies that aim to understand entanglements of biology and society -so-called 'hybrid childhoods' (Prout 2005) . I then provide two extended examples, taken from my own research into alternative education spaces, and from recent cross-disciplinary studies of attachment theory. I cite these two examples with the principal aim of stretching how children's geographers might conceive of the relationality of children with adults and, indeed, the relationality of children's emotions. I am not necessarily advocating that children's geographers (or others interested in emotion) should focus primarily upon alternative learning spaces, or work with or adopt approaches from attachment theory. Rather, building on my critique of Mitchell and Elwood (2012) in section I, I attend to the potential implications (both substantive and conceptual) of attending to hybrid childhoods, in what I understand to be significant ways that both map onto but go beyond concerns with voice, agency and/or politics.
In section III -an extended discussion and conclusion -Iquestion what might be the role of children's geographers -and children's emotional geographies -in interrogating hybrid childhoods.Specifically, and despite my enthusiasm for children's emotional geographies of all kinds, I offer some words of caution. I sketch out a series of critical questions with which children's emotional geographers may wish to engage: initially, if theorisations of hybrid childhoodsare to supplement other approaches to children's emotional geographies; and, more broadly, if children's geographers are to criticallyengage with the multiple, potential uses to which emotions may be put in relation to children's lives.
I Going beyond 'voice' and/or (independent) 'agency'?
The so-called 'new social studies of childhood' represented a profound shift in scholarly research with children, evincing a series of core principles through which 'biological' concerns with children's development were virtually replaced with the 'social' constructions 5 and processes through which childhoods were constituted. Two foundational principleswhich were rapidly adopted by geographers -were that children be afforded greater 'voice' (in academic research and elsewhere) and that they be viewed as capable, ostensibly independent agents. Few researchers working with children accepted that children's 'voice' or 'agency' came without (adult-)imposedlimits -far from it. However, these two principles did become somewhat of a mantra: without directly naming names, it would not be too difficult to find scores of articles that end by pressing for greater 'participation' by children on this or that issue, or that, actually, children are far more capable and independent than adults usually admit. If nothing else, I will readily accept that I have made this argument more than once (most often in research with policy-makers); I will also, therefore, be quite clear that for this reason I am not arguing that, in going 'beyond' voice or agency, childhood scholars should dismiss such principles outright. To do so would be to lose some of the hardwon gainsachieved by childhood researchers and advocates over the last twenty years, and to efface the enormous variety of ways in which those two terms have been deployed. However, I want to suggest a more measured, more modest process of 'going beyond' voice and agency, on two fronts. On the first front, recent work by geographers and others has raised critical questions about not only the desirability but the possibility of voice and/or agency. Space precludes a full review, but I want to highlight just two examples. First, Philo (2011, 125) examines occasions where it might be inappropriate to listen to a child's voicefor instance (borrowing from Foucault) if a child should wish "for sexual relations with a given adult". Indeed, Philo notes an obvious contradiction within children's geographies research where children's voices (and feelings) about play, work or school attract significant attention, but where (for whatever reasons), children's articulations of their sexuality attract far less (also Vanderbeck 2008 A range of other scholars has sought to question the limits of children's voice and participation (e.g. Hemrica and Hayting 2004; King 2007) , whilst others view some examples of children's 'voice' and participation as an abrogation of adult responsibility (Conroy 2010) .
I pick up on this point later in this section, with particular reference to children's emotions.
Second, important advances in relational geographies of age have, on the one hand, questioned the privileging of certain age groups in geographical research (principally 5-12 year-olds) and, on the other, critiqued a widespread practice amongst children's geographers, in particular, to consider children on their own (Hopkins and Pain 2007) . To paraphrase, a curious effect of viewing children as independent 'agents' has commonly been to efface the intergenerational relationships that not only constitute childhoods, but construct experiences of age-itself.Several studies have therefore sought to address this lacuna (e.g. Tucker 2003; Wyn et al. 2012) . At the same time, several studies have sought to nibble away at presumptions of children's independence that seem to preoccupy not only some academics, but popular commentators on childhood. An example that particularly detains geographers is children's so-called 'independent mobility', which has apparently been in decline in contexts like the UK for decades (e.g. O'Brien et al. 2000) . Writing against the grain, Mikkelsen and Christensen (2009) argue that children's mobility is, in fact, rarely independent -their travels maybe undertaken with parents, friends, pets and various others -and that, therefore, their 7 relative 'independence' is not necessarily an indicator of the quality or worth of their movements. Developing relational geographies of age, I return to the relationality of emotions, specifically, at several points in this paper.
On the second front, and bearing in mind the above critiques, I want to observe a tendency for children's geographies to place emotions directly in the service of some particular, often quite instrumental notions of voice and/or agency. Children's geographers are by no means alone here: for instance, Zembylas (2007, 60) notes how, in the field of educational studies, research on emotions is dominated by information-gathering "about the causes of emotion, the way a teacher or student felt" and about how emotion management occurs in the classroom. My point is not to dismiss or downplay the importance of using emotion in such an instrumental way. For, even if one does subscribe to the above critiques of voice/agency, these critiques are not universally applicable. Indeed, there is nothing of necessity wrong with using emotion as a way to highlight how, for instance, anger might be a key driver to children's engagement in decision-making (Valentino et al., 2009 ).
My argument is, instead, that emotion has tended to be used in three relatively narrow ways.
Firstly, whilst many studies leave emotion pretty much unremarked, it is notable that several texts list 'emotion' as one of a series of possible concerns for participatory work with children (e.g. Holt 2004; Percy-Smith 2010) . Emotion is a 'factor', mentioned once or twice before being ticked off. My intention is not to reprimand this impulse and especially not the two examples cited here: indeed, such lists may emphasise that emotion should be placed on equal footing with other considerations for doing participation. I simply want to ask whether -as academics -we are satisfied, yet, that we know enough about the complex emotional implications of (in this case) participation to list them in this way.
Secondly, it is evident that several texts evaluate some of the many emotional outcomes of doing participation with children (cfZembylas 2007). Most frequently, it is assumed that participation -especially 'having a voice' -has positive benefits for children (e.g. increased self-efficacy), whereas non-participation may have negative outcomes, including anxiety (Tisdall et al. 2006) . However, Hemrica and Heyting (2004) caution that the same participatory process may have differential emotional outcomes for different children. In their study, some children who participated in decisions regarding their parents' divorce settlements were traumatised by the process whereas others were not. Their work questions the assumption amongst most scholars (and practitioners) that the emotional outcomes of participation can be used as an instrumental justification for it being a central tool for adult engagement with children (see alsoPinkney 2011).
Thirdly, several authors have indicated how emotions and affects may constitute participatory processes (Kraftl and Horton 2007; Jupp 2008 ). However, a frequent observation is that during meetings with adults (particularly in 'applied' settings, rather than academic research), young people are urged to downplay a vast array of emotions in order to transform their feelings into 'reasoned' argumentation (Tholander 2007) . These critiques are complicated where, on the one hand, participation feels increasingly to young people like an obligation and, on the other, as far as young people are concerned, predominantly verbal-participatory techniques efface how young people feel (Faulkner 2009 ). This is a critique, then, of howsome participatory processes manufacture children's emotions into a more-or-less acceptable form of 'voice'.
Two choices (of many): moving beyond instrumentalism, or, moving towards a reinvigoration
of 'voice'? 9 Thus far, I have criticised a sub-set of work on children's voice/agency, focussing on three deployments of emotion children's geographies research and elsewhere. Before moving on, I
want to highlight just two of many possible pathways beyond these critiques. In the first, I
want to acknowledge how, despite my comments on emotion/participation above, participatory work with children has been at the forefront of a groundswell of work that has sought to foreground diverse ways in which children may act 'politically' -often without such instrumental recourse to 'voice' or 'agency'. In the second, I briefly examine calls to reassert the significance of 'voice' and a politics of representation. These positions are not necessarily mutually exclusive; moreover, both are in my view viable positions, which will prove valuable for my later argument.
My first argument is that a diverse range of studies has attempted to move beyond (but not necessarily dismiss), a focus upon children's voice/agency. This has been accomplished on a number of fronts, and, crucially, involves a sensitisation to emotion that operates in various ways. Firstly,visual andperformative methods of participatory research (such as participatory diagramming and video)have admitted more inclusive, richer and alternative registers of feeling into participatory processes (Kindon 2003; Waite and Conn 2011) . Thus, participatory researchbecomesanexpressive, rather than instrumentally representational/representative, form of knowledge production where literal 'voice-ing' is accompanied by various other expressive registers (the visual, the haptic, the danced). One inspirational example comes from UK-based organisation Youth Music, whose action-research projects combine reporting on the 'measurable outcomes' of community-based youth music programmes with attention to how young people have been moved by the process -often only evident from the sonorous and lyrical qualities of their music (Dickens 2010 ; see also Dickens and Lonie, this issue) . In a very different context, Waite and Conn (2011, 115) characterise their work with young Ugandan women on sexual health thus: "'participatory video drama'" describes [...] innovative methodological tools to utilise when working with participants who experience voicelessness in their everyday lives". At the very least, such approaches allow for a return to an expanded notion of 'voice' -where 'voicelessness' may not only denote an inability for a particular young person to represent themselves, but an attempt to challenge more thoroughgoing systems of oppression via multiple expressive registers (see Cahill [2010] for a key example). Another key feature of this work is how children are not considered as 'independent agents' within participatory processes, but operate relationally through engagement with each other and in solidarity with adults.
Beyond participatory work, a range of youth studies have also looked beyond voice and independent agency to stress the many emotions involved in modes of 'being political'. (2010) showed how US middle-class children learn to express culturally-appropriate emotions in everyday situations. Here, emotions were neither directed towards participation 'in' some greater political project, nor towards any identifiably political act, but rather, were a core, ongoing component of collaborative sense-making and contingent social formation. Elsewhere, my own work with young people identified how young people expressed styles of hopefulness that were, perhaps counter-intuitively, non-intentionally utopian (Kraftl, 2008) . I showed how, for some very disadvantaged 16-25 year-olds living in England, banal, practical acts (like learning to cook soup or keeping warm) could elicit more hopeful dispositions that were crucial to coping and going on with life. Relatedly, Rachel Pain's work on "emotional geopolitics of fear" (Pain 2009, 466) and hope (Pain et al. 2010) has demonstrated how such gestures, imaginations and hopes may cross between 'locally-scaled' emotions and 'global' political processes.
In very different ways, all of this work is concernedwith how efficacy is expressed -whether A second pathway 'beyond' instrumentalism has, in fact, been premised in part on this question about politics: upon what is in essence a redoubling of efforts to foreground children's voice. Recently, Mitchell and Elwood (2012, 789) have urged caution about "heterogeneous and performative" renderings of politics (cf. Kallio and Häkli 2010) , and especially those which, drawing upon nonrepresentational theories, seem to efface "holistic 12 analysis". Lacking attention to systemic forms of inequality, Mitchell and Elwood (2012, 793) argue that nonrepresentational children's geographies have become personal (for scholars), self-referential endeavours more caught up with the research process itself than "theories of dominance and subordination". Apparently, whilst articulating everyday "amorphous concepts", such as hope, they only offer vague senses of "larger issues" (Mitchell and Elwood 2012, 793) . Finally, they lack a sense of voice, meant in representational terms:
"[w]e argue that representational strategies of articulation [writing, mapping] are vital in forging meaningful social relationships between children and adults; they allowchildren to cross over from their 'animalistic' infancy and young childhood into the adult-constructedworld of 'humanness'. For poor children, in particular, practices that do notengage representational codes are not necessarily liberating (as they may be for privilegedadults) but more likely to be the reverse" (Mitchell and Elwood 2012, 801 ).
Mitchell and Elwood raise a series of important questions about the deployment of emotions in children's geographies that -in my terms -somehow go 'beyond' a concern for voice. Yet, I want to argue, in the process they are mischaracterising much work in nonrepresentational geography and, moreover, downplaying the full range of studies that have sought to engage carefully with the emotions entailedin participatory research, activism and everyday life. Even if many are not labelled 'nonrepresentational', they still seek to move beyond representation somehow and, often, to foreground the importance of emotion in ways that do not simply lead instrumentally to narrow conceptions of voice. I therefore want to weave a careful and sympathetic path between their critique and my conviction that nonrepresentational approaches (amongst others) enable a move beyond voice/agency in some productive ways.Three (of many) issues stand out, and which I shall seek to use constructively in the rest of this paper.
First, Mitchell and Elwood insist that nonrepresentational approaches are all attempting to articulate "a personal, microconception of politics" (Mitchell and Elwood 2012, 793) .
However, some nonrepresentational geographers are not trying to propound any conception of 'politics' at all. Rather, they are interested in 'what matters' to children, which may not always be reduced to 'the political'. For instance, in his study of popular cultures in primary schools around S Club 7 (an erstwhile British pop band), Horton (2010) distinguishes between meaning and mattering. He argues that, all-too-often, youth scholars have focussed on the symbolic meaning of popular cultures and related emotions -for instance, how they form symbolic resources for identity construction, with by-now well-known political associations (e.g. Gelder 2005) . He argues instead for closer attention to how popular cultures matter, in context, to children: because they are 'just fun'; because they tack together friendships; because adults cannot quite understand what they mean (often, because they might not mean much). It maybe that to engage in such practices is a mark of privilege (although I doubt it always is), but it would be very problematic if all of life could be reduced to a concern with politics when life means and feels so much more to at least some, if not most, children.Section II picks up on this point by examining some ways in which emotions might matter in ways that tend to exceed -but not necessarily evade -questionsof politics.
Second, at the same time, Mitchell and Elwood gloss how nonrepresentational geographers, and others,have woven considerations of emotion, affect, embodiment and banality into (apparently) 'larger' concerns. Take, for instance, the examples above provided from participatory geographies through which issues of 'voicelessness' (Waite and Conn 2010) , health service provision (Kraftl and Horton 2007) , urban change (Jupp 2008 ) and immigrant identities (Cahill 2010) are not divorced from more-than-representational strategies for 14 witnessing young people's lives. Or, take recent studies of 'activism' by/for young people, where 'what counts' as activism is constituted through the seeming banalities and feelings of everyday life (Martin et al. 2007; Horton and Kraftl 2009a, 2009b) . I return to the intermingling of emotion, banality and 'what matters' (including questions of politics) in sections II and III.
Third, Mitchell and Elwood (2012, 801) end with an interestingreflection on the path from'animalistic infancy' to adult-constructed human-ness, where representational strategies are apparently key to their progress (see above quotation).Theirs is an astute point, which repeats some critiques of 'participatory' work that seek to shoe-horn children's emotions into adult, representational frames (Faulkner 2009 ). In section II, however, I want initially to offer a different spin on this argument -one that recognises the more-than-human (if you like, 'animalistic') components of emotion. This will become part of my argument for not only moving beyond voice/agency, but (for a moment at least), beyond 'politics'. However, having argued thus, and in this case fully concurring with Mitchell and Elwood, I will (re)turn to some important cautionary questions about politics andemotion in section III.
II Emotions, social relations and more-than-social (biosocial) childhoods
"Psychotherapeutic approaches suggest that, wherever interpersonal contact exists, the quality of care relationships is not dependent solely or even primarily upon the ability of the carer to deploy expert knowledge about care needs: the relationship itself is also vital [as] needs and feedback about care are communicated. This communication is multi-faceted: it may be verbal, visual, tactile, intuitive, tacit, unconscious and so on.
[…] It is also invariably emotionally laden" (Bondi 2008, 262, my emphasis) .
In this section, I argue that there remains significant scope for opening out the nature and quality of what Bondi, above, calls 'emotionally laden' relationships between people, which, building on my arguments in the previous section, explicitly incorporate but go beyond both voice and agency. This is a task that Blazek (this volume) accomplishes in a richer empirical sense, through reflections on the emotional relationship between two brothers. More broadly, the relationality of emotion has become a key point of articulation for (feminist) geographers writing on care (e.g. Milligan 2005), recent studies of intergenerationality and intimacy (R. Thus, voice is viewed as a situated, contingent process that emerges out of heterogeneous constituent parts -everyday interactional practices, hearing technologies, the relative functioning of a child's ear and their mastery of language, adult-child power relations, predominant discourses about childhood, and so on. The "heterogeneous and performative" elements of childhood research so derided by Mitchell and Elwood (2012, 789) are reframed within and as part of apparently 'larger' concerns. Following poststructural conceptions of scale, 'big' issues are initially placed horizontally with everyday practices and seemingly banal technologies, until it (sometimes) becomes possible to say whether it is governmental discourses, technologies or everyday practices that hold most explanatory power in a given situation (Jacobs 2006 ). Lee and Motzkau (2011, 13) argue that "the contemporary bio-politics of childhood is a mostly uncharted space in which novel and unpredictable connections between forces and processes of many kinds can occur". In the rest of this section, I focus on some of the implications of the hybridity argument for studying children's emotions -something that Lee and Motzkau do not directly address and which, in my mind, represent some of the vast 'uncharted' territories to which they refer.I offer what I term 'more-than-social' emotions as a 'navigational aid' for traversing and making some sense of the infinite range of hybrid childhoods.I prefer the term 'more-than-social' for four reasons. First, to avoid the term 'biological', in a way that accounts not only for the multiple ways in which what are called 'biological processes' become socialised, but that recognises that (especially) contemporary forms of sociality are constituted by technologies and knowledges wherein it is impossible to discern where the 'social' starts or ends (Anderson 2012) . Second, then, the term encapsulates a going-beyond the usual terms of social relations (for instance, of intergenerational relations), but by no means an attempt to dispense with or deny their importance.
If anything, it is an additive move that seeks an expanded sense of the constituents in relations between and beyond human beings -of, for instance, the role of neuroscientific chemical processes in intergenerational relations between parents/carers and children. Third, the example of neuroscience should indicate that I am interested not only in nonhuman matter ostensibly situated 'outside' the human body (say, a toy), but with those processes that occur within, through and across them (for a fabulous discussion of food in this vein, see Bennett 2010). Thus, the 'more-than-social' denotes how nonhuman components of emotional processes are internalised (perhaps, personalised), as much as and at the same time as they are externalised (perhaps, socialised). This should not be taken as a return to the apparently "personal" excesses of nonrepresentational theory (Mitchell and Elwood 2012, 793) , but to the process of emotions that are both excessively personal and exceed beyond personhood.
Fourth, the term is meant to resonate with the 'more-than-representational' connotations of affect (Lorimer 2005) , as some kind of atmosphere produced through constellations of human and nonhuman agents (Anderson 2009 ).
More-than-social emotions I: alternative learning spaces
In this section, I focus upon articulations of emotions within alternative education. By 'alternative education', I mean pedagogies, practices and spaces that are deliberately positioned as some kind of alternative to mainstream, state-sponsored/controlled schooling, where that latter system is either mandated or assumed for children's education. In the UK and other Minority Global North contexts, alternative education can take many forms, including homeschooling (Kraftl 2013a practice mean anything from a scrap of urban wasteland to a remote forest) is only one. To generalise, these principles include: a visit to an unfamiliar place that children would not normally access; repetition -usually for an afternoon a week for a course of six weeks; managed risk, and particularly tasks like fire-lighting and den-building that children would not do in school (Knight 2009; Ridgers et al. 2012 ). Forest School is therefore not about putting children in 'some nature' for an afternoon, but a carefully-thought-through process in which, admittedly, nature is conceived in some peculiar ways (section III) but, at the same time, it is activated and engaged through repetition, through unfamiliarity, and through tasks like fire-lighting which are as much about human adaptation of 'nature' as they are a priori
These observations lead to two critical points about outdoor, therapeutic and green learning.
The first is that, whilst natural processes are afforded greater attention and, in some cases, Several practitioners told me about 'special moments' where a group of children had suddenly become silent in response to a particular 'nature' event -seeing a wild animal, listening to wind in the trees -but it transpired that these events only mattered, in emotional and educational terms, because they were situated within the carefully-choreographed practices of practitioners and children. The package -the more-than-social package, which attempts to admit nature, albeit in specific ways -might work, but that is all that can be said.
The second critical point is about emotion. Resonant with philosophical conceptions of habit (Carlisle 2009; Bissell 2012) , Clive figures habit as a channelling of emotional energies towards particular ways of relating to the world that are, specifically, un-thought (done 'without thinking'). This engagement is four-fold, interweaving: engagements with nature (animals, trees, horticulture, a wildlife project at the farm); engagements with material objects (kicking or fixing a pipe); engagements with others (with Clive and, ultimately, a return to school); engagements with emotion (with the drivers of habit and affect that I will discuss later). Understood thus, Clive's articulation of habit is, once again, more-than-social.
A final question -perhaps the most significant -is why all of this matters to alternative educators, parents, and to children themselves. Clearly, this kind of inquiry requires extended consideration (see Kraftl 2013b) . But let me offer four suggestions, which, in the terms of my critique of Mitchell and Elwood (2012) at once extend beyond and reverberate with politics.
First, the training of habit is meant -ideally-to lead to some important emotional outcomes:
24 to improved well-being, happiness, self-esteem and children's ability to socialise and communicate with others -how someone 'has moved'. Second, at places like Care Farms and Forest Schools, the channelling of habits is geared towards some instrumental outcomes whose benefits one can debate, but which are generally considered to be advantageous: in particular, providing young people with the confidence to go back to school, paid work, a difficult family situation or, even, in the case of a school I visited for badly-bullied children, the hard-fought ability tosimply look another child in the eye (see Hayes and Herbert 2011) . hybrid conceptions of more-than-social emotions are one key to understanding these accounts 25 of mattering. The fourth suggestion is that, for all of this mattering, hybrid or more-thansocial emotions also raise concerns, with which (children's) geographers are well-placed to grapple. I return to these in section III.
More-than-social emotions II: attachment theories
In Attachment theory has its bases in psychoanalysis, psychiatry, evolutionary theory, ethology and, latterly, neuroscience. Whilst the term attachment has various colloquial uses, it is most frequently used to describe bonds forged between an infant and an attachment figure (frequently a mother). Early work by Bowlby (1969) and others figured attachment theory as "a kind of 'spatial' theory in which the closer the attachment figure, then the more happy and at ease the infant" (Music 2011, 61) . Whilst critiques of developmental psychology remain as pertinent as ever to socialconstructivist accounts of childhood, its study has both diversified and developed since the 1970s -a point made wonderfully in Aitken and Herman's (1997) seminal re-reading of Winnicott's notion of 'transitional space' in young children's play. Where Aitken and Herman (1997) focussed upon developing relations between infants' selves and the material world, I am specifically interested in the inter-personal relations accounted for by contemporary theories of attachment. Again, acknowledging critiques of the questionable political ends to which neuroscience may be put (Pykett 2012 ; section III), I want carefully to suggest that insights from the emergent discipline of neuroscience mighthelp geographers to engage in the development of a "complex biopsyschosocial model"of attachment (Hart 2006, xiv) .
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Thus -in the vein of Bennett's (2010) recent work -it might be possible to admit the genetic, chemical and electrical processes through which human lives (and attachments) are formed. This is to emphasise the role of the more-than-social in the constitution of the social in ways that most social studies of childhood do not. Thus, as Kandel (2005) (Hart 2006, xii) .
Two concrete examples of how neuroscientists understand inter-personal relations and emotions may help. Firstly, in a famous study, Rizzolatti (2005) wired monkeys so that it was possible to see a particular neuron firing when they reached for some food. But his astounding finding was that when one of the researchers reached for his food, the same neuron fired in the monkey's brain. Thus, the ability to empathise with others' emotions is learned (in context) but also has neurological bases (which in turn can be trained -like the habits of which many alternative educators speak). Secondly, a study by Bartels and Zeki (2004) The deactivation of neural networks is as important as the reward system, however, because
[it] may be that once one is closely familiar with aperson (in a positive or negative way), the need to assess the socialvalidity of that person is reduced.
[...] The neural mechanisms suppressed here might be the same that, when active, are responsible for maintaining an emotional barrier towards less familiar people" (Bartels and Zeki 2004, 1164) .
There are several implications to this (admittedly complex) work. Most significant for this paper is that contemporary attachment theories resonate with the rather more overtly spiritual, than-social agents and processes, the questions I have raised around education and attachment may offer some "navigational aids" (Lee and Motzkau 2011, 8) to future research on children's emotional geographies and, more broadly, on the varied terrains of emotional and affectual geographies.
At the same time, I want to raise a set of concerns about both the empirical content and the approaches I discussed in section II.As will become clear, I will, in part, link back to Mitchell and Elwood's (2012) questions about the politics of childhood; but I will also turn to some other political questions effaced by their partial reading of nonrepresentational geographies.
However, these concerns are, I suggest, not only pertinent to the fields of alternative education and attachment theory, but may offer complementary, critical points of departure for (re) thinking and (re) doing children's emotional geographies -and, indeed, for reflecting more broadly upon how and, even, why geographers study emotion and affect.
My first concern is with the possible uses of attachment theory in propounding and analysing certain modes of ordering social spaces. For, one implication of attachment theories is that, despite decades of work on the social construction of childhood, gender and the family "it is nonetheless important to recognize that bonds of affection and affiliation, nurture and care, may indeed offer the family certain advantages" (Conroy 2010, 334 My second, related, concern seems at first glance to be limited to fields of alternative education that have presaged 'therapeutic' values in learning spaces. But it is not. In fact, it raises a critical question -in part posed by Mitchell and Elwood (2012) , and in part implied in the scope of this special issue -about why it is that we need to know how children feel. By this generic 'we' I mean in this instance not only academics, but educators, policy-makers, and the whole gamut of practitioners working with or for children. What is it that we seek to gain from knowing, and intervening in, how children feel? Why is it that 'therapeutic' approaches -and attendant interests in 'emotional literacy', neuroscience and habit formation My final concern is with inter-related studies of biopolitics, hybridity and affect. Tellingly, in their analysis of hybrid childhoods, Lee and Motzkau (2011, 14) issue a warning about whether and how, "once researchers are engaged in, curious about or invested in such a topic and ready to recognize the full range of factors involved in it, how can that engagement be converted into manageable empirical questions?" For, once cognisant of different kinds of hybridity, it is unclear how (say, compared with different social constructions of childhood) those hybridities might be contrasted, or how those findings might be applied to different contexts (Lee and Motzkau 2011) . In their view, the firm ground provided by either biological or social approaches is no longer sufficient in light of contemporary biopolitics. Nevertheless, an attention to hybridity does little to contextualise or aid critical, politicised comparisons (and here I agree with Mitchell and Elwood 2012). But, rather than dismiss hybridity, Lee and Motzkau call for particular "multiplicities" -resource, voice and life -in which hybridities can be channelled and articulated in order to allow critical comparison between case studies.
My concern for children's emotional geographies, then, comes in three parts. First, in terms of how children's geographers might become involved in critical studies of the biopolitics of childhood and the circulation of affects about childhood -although strides have already been made in terms of work on hope (Kraftl 2008 ) obesity (B. Evans 2010) and neuroscience (Pykett 2012) , to name but three examples. Second, in terms of children's geographers' articulation of 'multiplicities' in which spatial processes maybe invoked: I have suggested that two possible multiplicities might centre around questions of 'therapy' in alternative and mainstream education, and around the more-than-social emotional relations that have become the focus for attachment theories. Third, Lee and Motzkau (2011) do not account in any great depth for the experiences of children (nor do they purport to). It is here, then, that questions of 'voice' and 'agency' may return: as constituent elements in children's emotional geographies that go beyond, but do not seek to dismiss voice/agency as they appear in more-than-social relations. Like all of my concerns in this final section, the issue may well not always be reducible to politics as, for instance, multiplicities surrounding 'therapy' encompass but extend beyond politics, into (equally important) questions of well-being and morality. At the same time, these concerns are political in a broader sense, because, like other interventions (e.g. Vanderbeck 2008), they ask children's geographers to consider their motivations for whether and how they do children's emotional geographies.
